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INCENTIVES AND IDEOLOGY
James Kwak*
"If only the King knew!, we cried a thousand times from the depths
of our abyss."
- Cahiers de dol~ances de Cahors, 17891
On November 4, 2008, Barack Obama won the United States pres-
idential election, defeating John McCain by over seven percentage
points in the popular vote. 2 That same day, his party gained larger
majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate than either
party had held at the same time since the Carter administration. 3
President Obama was elected in the midst of a severe financial crisis
that wiped out half the value of U.S. stock markets and caused a net
loss of almost nine million jobs. 4 More than anything else, the public
expected him to do something about it: protect the financial system, re-
store the economy to health, and reform financial markets so that such
a disaster could not happen again.
Professor Adam Levitin's Book Review 5 surveys five books provid-
ing accounts of what happened next, as well as a sixth (The Banker's
New Clothes) that focuses on what should happen in the future. These
books provide different perspectives on the failure of financial regula-
tors to prevent the crisis and their many stumbles in responding to it.
Behind the blow-by-blow narratives and specific policy suggestions,
* James Kwak is Associate Professor of Law and William T. Golden Scholar at the University
of Connecticut School of Law.
1 Quoted in GRAHAM ROBB, THE DISCOVERY OF FRANCE: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR 81 (2007).
2 FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE
U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5-6 (2009).
3 Id. at 3; Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last
visited May 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/X5LP-7TRT, Party Division in the Senate,
1789-Present, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one-item-
and teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited May 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/84DZ-gXCE.
4 Wilshire 5ooo Full Cap Price Index, ECONOMIC RESEARCH: FED. RESERVE BANK OF
ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WILL5oooPRFC (last visited May 13, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/JP7X-DWVZ; Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current
Employment Statistics Survey (National), BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/dsrv?ce (choose "Seasonally adjusted"; then choose "Total nonfarm"; then choose "All Em-
ployees, Thousands"; then choose "Total nonfarm"; then select "Retrieve data").
5 Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Poli-
tics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. i99i (2014) (reviewing six books on the financial crisis).
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Levitin identifies a more fundamental question of regulatory structure
and accountability in the modern administrative state. According to
one story, which is popular in Washington, financial regulation is an
apolitical, technocratic exercise, and it failed because the technocrats
did not have the right tools. But in a second telling, which Levitin
prefers, regulation is inescapably political, and it failed because regula-
tors were captured by the very financial institutions they were charged
with overseeing.
I agree with Levitin that "the real challenge for financial regulation
is not in perfecting technical details ... but in taming the politics of
financial regulation. '6 How can this be done? Levitin discusses three
possible approaches: increasing political accountability; modifying the
"regulatory architecture" to reduce the possibility of capture; and mo-
bilizing different interest groups to offset the dominant players.7 The-
se are all valuable ways of correcting for the capture mechanisms that
he identifies as particularly effective in the financial setting: charter
shopping, shared incentives of regulator and regulated, sustained per-
sonal familiarity, and buying congressional representatives with cam-
paign contributions.8 For example, as Levitin describes, the financial
independence of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should
prevent the kind of abject, fee-chasing behavior practiced by the late
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).9
These types of "change[s] in governance structures for financial
regulation" I will make it possible for regulators to act in the interest
of the public rather than that of the financial sector. This is a neces-
sary condition for a safer financial system - but it may not be suffi-
cient (and Levitin does not claim that it is).
In pre-Revolutionary France, common people would often say of
their problems, "If only the King knew .... "11 Whatever evils they
suffered at the hand of their government must be due to the king's
ministers and officials, for the king himself could not be at fault. But
the king knew exactly what was going on.
As Levitin shows, our financial regulators were and remain deeply
enmeshed in a complex political environment. At the margin, they
have the discretion to do favors for the industry or for specific institu-
tions (such as the OTS backdating a capital infusion by IndyMac to
6 Id. at 2049.
7 Id. at 1993-94.
8 Id. at 2041-44.
9 Id. at 2055-56.
10 Id. at 2o68.
11 In French, "Si le Roi savait." See, e.g., I JULES MICHELET, HISTOIRE DE LA
REVOLUTION FRAN(§AISE 78 (Paul Ollendorff 1889) (1847).
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make it seem well capitalized when it actually wasn't12). But major
regulatory decisions, such as turning a blind eye to derivatives or bail-
ing out banks, are made by the political system as a whole.
For me, two quotations punctuate the story of the financial crisis.
One is Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers telling Brooksley
Born in 1998, "I have thirteen bankers in my office, and they say if
you go forward with this you will cause the worst financial crisis since
World War 11. '' 13 (By "this," he was referring to Born's proposal to
consider regulating over-the-counter derivatives.) The other is an un-
named Treasury official saying in 2010, "Brown-Kaufman would have
broken up the six biggest banks in America .... If we'd been for it, it
probably would have happened. But we weren't, so it didn't."14
One quotation shows a government official blocking regulation of
the complex derivatives that later played a crucial role in both the in-
flation of the credit bubble and its spectacular collapse in 2008. In the
other, a government official talks about blocking the most aggressive
legislative attempt to reform the financial sector. Both are from the
Treasury Department - which is directly accountable to the president.
There are other examples: according to Representative Zoe Lofgren,
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner was "really dismissive" about mort-
gage "cramdown" (allowing bankruptcy judges to reduce the principal
owed on mortgages), a campaign promise made by then-candidate
Obama; 15 the administration instead supported a housing program
backed by the financial lobby that functioned as a back-door bank
bailout.16
More generally, we can't blame everything on the bureaucrats.
The financial non-regulation that made the 2008 crash possible was
the explicit policy of multiple presidential administrations, and some of
its most important elements sailed through Congress with bipartisan
12 Edmund L Andrews, Irregularity Uncovered at IndyMac, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/I2/23/business/23thrift.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B7CC-
FEWE.
13 Quoted - based on the recollection of Born's lieutenant Michael Greenberger - in Manuel
Roig-Franzia, Brooksley Born, the Cassandra of the Derivatives Crisis, WASH. POST (May 26,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR200 9052502108-
pf.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AE8L-LN 4 F.
14 Quoted in John Heilemann, Obama is from Mars, Wall Street is from Venus, N.Y. MAG.
(May 22, 2010), http://nymag.com/news/politics/66188, archived at http://perma.cc/35WG-L8ZA.
The Brown-Kaufman Amendment to what became the Dodd-Frank Act would have placed strict
size limits on financial institutions.
15 Paul Kiel & Olga Pierce, Dems: Obama Broke Pledge to Force Banks to Help Homeowners,
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 4, 2011, 8:48 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/dems-obama-broke-
pledge-to-force-banks-to-help-homeowners, archived at http://perma.cc/4PD9-4VG9.
16 NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT. AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF HOW WASHINGTON
ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 156-57 (2012).
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support.17 The choice to bail out large banks rather than homeowners
was made by the Bush and Obama Administrations. And Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which largely left in place the regulatory
system that had failed so spectacularly, with the Administration lobby-
ing heavily to weaken the most far-reaching reforms. 8 In other words,
President Obama knew exactly what was going on - just as President
Clinton knew what was going on when he signed the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, allowing the consolidation of commercial and investment
banking.
Levitin recognizes that elected politicians always have influence
over financial regulation. "[I]n Washington," he writes, "agency inde-
pendence notwithstanding, one does not refuse the President." 19  He
also highlights the problem of "legislative capture": the ability of in-
dustry to use its financial clout to influence Congress and, indirectly,
agencies that are overseen by Congress. 20 Whether it comes from the
executive or the legislative branch, that influence will not necessarily
be used in the public interest; in practice, both branches were united
behind the policies that produced the financial crisis.
At the same time, regulators were not simply taking orders from
their political masters. Deregulation and bank bailouts were as popu-
lar in the regulatory agencies as in the Treasury and the White House
- and not only to curry favor with financial institutions or their con-
gressional water-carriers. The Federal Reserve is as independent as
independent agencies come, and for most of our story it was controlled
by a man with his own base of popular support. 21 Federal Reserve
Chair Alan Greenspan maintained repeatedly that "private regulation
generally is far better at constraining excessive risk-taking than is gov-
ernment regulation"22 and that "[r]isks in financial markets, including
17 For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of rggg was passed with final votes of go-8 in
the Senate and 362-57 in the House and was signed by a Democratic president. Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, S. goo, io6th Cong. (iggg) (enacted), archived at http://perma.cc/SSgT-ECBR.
18 Shahien Nasiripour & Ryan Grim, Obama's Treasury Dept. Working to Defeat Derivatives
Proposal 'Of Utmost Importance' to Reforming Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2010,
2:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2oIo/o6/I4/obamas-treasury-dept-work n 6iI2o5.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/SFM5-AP62; Matt Taibbi, Wall Street's Big Win, ROLLING STONE
(Aug. 4, 2010, i:oo PM), http://www.rollingstone.conmpolitics/news/wall-streets-big-win-20IO0804,
archived at http://perma.cc/S7JB-6FYQ.
19 Levitin, supra note 5, at 2020.
20 Id. at 2044.
21 Between 1997 and 2oo6, Alan Greenspan's favorable/unfavorable ratings ranged from +13
to +44 points. Joseph Carroll, Greenspan Gets High Marks from the Public, GALLUP (Jan. 30,
2oo6), http://www.gallup.com/poll/21 6o/greenspan-gets-high-marks-from-public.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/KRY8-VGPK.
22 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003 Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition (May 8, 2003) (transcript archived at http://perma.cc/8VG-2C 7 X).
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derivatives markets, are being regulated by private parties. ' '23 Green-
span's opposition to derivatives regulation, his refusal to enforce con-
sumer protection laws, and his reliance on low interest rates during the
housing boom all contributed to the financial crisis.
What Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and Tim Geithner have in
common is not just that all supported policies that were friendly to the
financial sector; they also shared an ideology: the belief that lightly
regulated financial markets are good for the economy The presidents
who appointed them and stood behind them endorsed that belief. This
ideology of finance was dogma from the I99OS until 2008 and has sur-
vived the financial crisis surprisingly intact, at least in inside-the-
Beltway policymaking circles. It was reflected in the bipartisan cam-
paign to increase homeownership by expanding subprime lending be-
fore the financial crisis, and it was reflected in the bipartisan campaign
to water down provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that might have put
constraints on real estate lending.2 4
Levitin is aware of the role of ideology; he lists ideological capture
as one mechanism of regulatory capture (and the one most apparent at
the Federal Reserve).2 5 But the problem of ideological capture is not
well addressed by structural reforms aimed at the governance of finan-
cial regulation. Increasing democratic accountability and increasing
agency insulation are alternative ways of modifying the pressures on
regulators and the incentives that they face; mobilizing different indus-
try interest groups is one way of reducing the seeming dominance of
the financial sector. These approaches can help level the playing field
in the corridors of power, and they are urgently needed.
But the marketplace of beliefs is another field of combat, and one
where money talks. Ideology does not fall ready-made from the sky.
Its raw materials are ideas, good or bad, that are often genuinely de-
veloped by their proponents and adopted by their adherents. Those
ideas are then manufactured into political weapons - through indus-
try-sponsored research (such as the Institute of International Finance's
report claiming that new regulations would make the U.S. economy
almost three percent smaller26), public relations campaigns, and lobby-
ing organizations. The financial sector, it's industry organizations, and
its sympathetic think tanks and super PACs together have an enor-
23 Quoted in Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/io/og/business/economy/oggreenspan.html?
pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/8Z98-Z 7RR.
24 Floyd Norris, Mortgages Without Risk, at Least for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.cOm/2 I3/II/29/business/mortgages-without-risk-at-least-for-the-banks.html?
pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/J8LC-NSW9.
25 Levitin, supra note 5, at 2042, 2044-45.
26 INST. OF INT'L FIN., THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF
CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 10 (2011).
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mous amount of ideological muscle. Compared to them, consumer or-
ganizations are underfunded and undermanned, and advocates for fi-
nancial stability are virtually nonexistent, apart from academics with
limited audiences. Levitin himself is one of the people fighting the
good fight, with his prolific publishing record and his repeated ap-
pearances before congressional committees, but he and his allies are
vastly outnumbered.
The result is a world in which many politicians and regulators be-
lieve that financial innovation is inherently good, that more credit is
always better, and that any constraints on financial markets will be
paid for in jobs. I certainly agree with Levitin that, if we want finan-
cial regulation to serve the public interest, we need to "change the po-
litical environment for regulation, ' '27 and he has outlined the key levers
that are available to that end. The other battle, however, is to con-
vince both politicians and regulators - and, ultimately, the public at
large - that what's good for Wall Street is not necessarily good for
America.
27 Levitin, supra note 5, at 2068.
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